Action By Minor Child For Alienation Of A
Parent\u27S Affection by unknown
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 22 | Issue 2 Article 9
Fall 9-1-1965
Action By Minor Child For Alienation Of A
Parent'S Affection
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Family Law Commons, and the Torts Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Action By Minor Child For Alienation Of A Parent'S Affection, 22 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 247 (1965),
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol22/iss2/9
1965] CASE COMMENTS 247
ACTION BY MINOR CHILD FOR ALIENATION OF A
PARENT'S AFFECTION
A majority of the jurisdictions in the United States recognize that
a husband or wife has a cause of action against a third party for alien-
ating the affections of the other spouse.l It is only within recent years,
however, that the question has been raised whether a child has a simi-
lar cause of action for the alienation of a parent's affection. 2
may be sustained in consequence thereof by the owners, charterers or operators of
any vessel or craft or by any other person or persons interested therein.
2. Tug Services will be supplied upon the condition that all towing, moving,
shifting, docking, undocking or other handling of a vessel or craft of any charac-
ter by a tug or tugs owned or employed by the Tug Company is done at the sole
risk of such vessel or craft and of the owners, charterers or operators thereof,
and the Master and crew of such tug or tugs used in the said services become the
servants of and identified with such vessel or craft and their owners, and that the
Tug Company only undertakes to provide motive power.
3. The Tug Company will not be responsible for the acts or defaults of the
Master or crew of such tug or tugs, or any of their servants or agents or
else whosoever, nor for any damages, injuries, losses or delays from whatsoever
cause arising that may occur either to such vessel or craft, or property or persons
on board thereof, or to any other ship or vessel or property of any kind whether
fixed or movable, and the Tug Company shall be held harmless and indemnified by
the Hirer against all such damages, injuries, losses and delays, and against all
claims in respect thereof.
4. Such exemption from liability shall apply regardless of whether such vessel
or craft assists in the services with its own steam or power or in any other way,
and irrespective of whether any employee of the Tug Company or the Master or
any of the crew of such tug or tugs is at the time of said services on board of such
vessel or craft, or in command thereof.
5. The foregoing conditions shall apply to any damages, injuries or loss from
whatsoever cause arising that may occur to the vessel or craft requiring the tug
or tugs or to any other vessel or craft, or to any person or property on board
thereof, or to any other property whether fixed or movable, while such tug or tugs
is or are in attendance upon or fast to or engaged in any manoeuvre for the purpose
of making fast to or disengaging from or proceeding clear from the vessel or craft
requiring the tug or tugs, provided however that the said conditions shall not
apply to loss of or damage to the tug or tugs or to property on board the tug or
tugs or to damage for personal injuries to or loss of life of members of the crews
of the tug or tugs or persons on board thereof, unless such loss or damage or such
damages for personal injuries or loss of life shall have been caused or contributed to
by the fault or negligence of the vessel or craft requiring the tug or tugs.
1Prosser, Torts § I'8 (3d ed. 1964).
2See Morrow v. Yannantuono, 152 Misc. 134, 273 N.Y. Supp. 912 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
The case of Coulter v. Coulter, 73 Coo. 144, 214 Pac. 400 (1923), in which a son
sixty-two years of age brought a joint suit for conspiracy for the alienation of his
mother's affections resulting in loss of support and for malicious prosecution in
having him committed to a state insane hospital, appears to be the first case to
present this question. In this case the question whether a child has a right of action
for the alienation of his parent's affection was discussed, but not decided, since the
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This problem is illustrated in the recent Ohio case of Kane v. Quig-
ley,3 wherein the Supreme Court of Ohio held4 that although in that
state an action by a spouse against a third party may be maintained,
a child does not have a comparable legal right, since the spouse's ac-
tion is based upon a right of consortium, 5 which does not exist be-
tween a parent and child. 6
Judge Gibson, in dissenting, stated that under the Ohio Consti-
tution 7 and in the best interest of the child and society8 such an ac-
tion should be maintainable. He further noted that the common law
was sufficiently flexible to encompass this cause of action.9
Although statutes have been passed which protect the infant's right
court denied recovery on the ground that every element of damage which the
plaintiff had allegedly sustained could be recovered in an action for malicious
prosecution. In Cole v. Cole, 277 Mass. 50, 177 N.E. 8io (1931), the court affirmed the
sustaining of a demurrer by a defendant-sister to her brother's charge of alienation
of their mother's affection, on the ground that it failed to set forth concisely and
with substantial certainty the substantive facts necessary to constitute a cause of
action. In the Cole case, however, the court did not directly discuss the brother's
right of a cause of action.
3iOhio St. 2d s, 203 N.E.2d 338 (1964).
'The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals which
had affirmed the trial court's sustaining of a demurrer.
6Supra note 3, at 340. The majority implied that its decision also might be
based on the ground that the child does not have a legal right of action against
the father for love and affection, and therefore a third party could not be liable
for depriving the child of something to which he had no legal right. The court, at
339, stated: "A child may indeed expect that his parent will have affection for
him. This may be a moral obligation, but no legal obligation exists." It is interest-
ing to note that the court did not follow the reasoning of the earlier Ohio case
of Gleitz v. Gleitz, 88 Ohio App. 337, 98 N.E.2d 74 (195i), in which the court, in
denying a minor child a right of action against his paternal grandparent for alien-
ation of his father's affection, stated: "[XV]e do not feel constrained to encroach
upon the prerogatives of the legislative branch of the government." 98 N.E.2d at 74.
02o3 N.E.2d at 339.
7Id. at 344. Judge Gibson states: "Section 16, Article i of the Ohio Constitution,
provides that 'All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him
in his lands, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law,
and shall have justice administered without denial or delay.'...In my opinion,
a child is injured in his person when a third person intentionally and maliciously
destroys that child's relationship with his parent which is so necessary for the welfare
of the child and society. The Constitution gives such a child a remedy." See also
Heck v. Schupp, 394 Ill. 296, 68 N.E.2d 464 (1946).
8203 N.E.2d at 343. Judge Gibson, in questioning the reasoning of the majority's
statement that the child had no legal right for affection from his parent, stated:
"The fact is that, unless interfered with, service, care and affection flow as a matter
of course from the relationship of a parent and child." 203 N.E.2d at 342. He also
noted that a child was allowed to recover for parental care and training in wrong-
ful death actions and in actions under Federal Employees' Liability Act.
9Judge Gibson stated: "The principles of the common law are determined by
the needs of society and are changed with changes in such needs." 203 N.E.2d at 343.
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of support, little has been done to secure his interest in the society and
affection of his parent.10 It was not until 1934, in the case of Morrow
v. Yannantuono," that a court squarely faced the question whether a
child should have a right of action against a third party for depriving
him of his parent's society and affection. In that case the plaintiff
child alleged that the defendant had maliciously and wrongfully de-
prived the plaintiff of the affection, comfort, and love of his mother
by enticing her away and harboring her.12 The court, in rejecting the
plaintiff's contention that each member of a family unit has a cause
of action against one who wrongfully interferes with that unit, held
that the child did not have a right to loss of consortium, which is the
basis of a spouse's action for alienation of affection; 13 and that recog-
nition of such an action would open the courts to a flood of liti-
gation.
14
This problem was not presented to a court again until 1945, in the
case of Daily v. Parker.15 In this case, four minor children brought an
action in a federal district court in Illinois, on the basis of diversity
of citizenship, against a woman who had allegedly enticed their father
to leave their home, thereby depriving them of their father's support,
society, and companionship. The District Court's ruling, which sus-
tained the defendant's demurrer, was reversed by the Circuit Court,
which held that the plaintiffs had stated a sufficient cause of action. 16
"Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations, 14 Mich. L. Rev. 177,
185 (1916).
U1 5 2 Misc. 134, 273 N.Y. Supp. 912 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
'-The plaintiff also alleged loss of support which the court considered sep-
arately from the question presented here.
"2Supra note 11, at 913. This is one of the basic arguments for denying the
action in the principal case.
14Morrow v. Yannantuono, supra note ii, at 913. Justice Close stated: "I am
convinced that to uphold this complaint would open our courts to a flood of litiga-
tion that would inundate them. It would mean that everyone whose cheek is
tinged by the blush of shame would rush into court to ask punitive damages to
compensate them for their distress of body and mind and the damage that their
reputation suffered in the community." 273 N.Y. Supp. at 914. In rejecting the
deterrent aspect of allowing the action, the court, at 914 held: "Behavior such
as accredited to the defendant here springs from motives that seldom if ever count
the financial cost."
5152 F.2d 174 (7 th Cir. 1945).
"The court remanded the case, however, on the ground that the question of
the amount of damages was one for the jury. The court in expressing some doubt
as to damages, stated: "There is, we must confess, weight to the argument that no
loss was suffered when the children were deprived of the society of a father who
deserted them to run away with a married woman and who left his wife and
children to struggle as best they could with the task of making a livelihood .... And
a father should have at least a shadow of character before his loss can be said to
create a claim for damages in his children." 152 F.2d at 177.
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In considering the recognition of the action, the Circuit Court divided
the children's rights into two groups.17 Firstly, the right to recover
for injuries which arise from their right to support and maintenance;
and secondly, the right to recover for injuries to feelings which arise
from their rights to the comfort, protection, and society of the father.
In deciding that minor children should also be entitled to recover
for interference with this second group of rights, the court engaged in
what is called "judicial empiricism", or lawmaking by judicial de-
cision.'8 The court reasoned that under the modern conception of
the family unit such a right should be recognized. 10
Since the Morrow and Daily decisions, the courts of fourteen other
jurisdictions have considered the question whether a child has a cause
of action for alienation of his parent's affection. Three of these juris-
dictions have followed the Daily decision,20 while eleven have followed
the Morrow case.
2 '
Although it appears that a majority of courts has denied the child's
right of action, the reasons for doing so have not been consistent. The
'7Supra note 15, at 176.
"'Supra note 15, at 177. The court stated: "And even in the common law, in 1945,
if no precedents be found, courts can hardly be advisedly called radical if they in
lawmaking by decisions, or in a word, engage in judicial empiricism." (Emphasis
added.) The coinage of the term "judicial empiricism" is generally thought to have
originated with Justice Pound. In Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law 181
(1921), Dean Pound, in referring to this "judicial empiricism," says, "Anglo-Ameri-
can law is fortunate indeed in entering upon a new period of growth with a
well-established doctrine of lawmaking by judicial decision."
"Supra note 15, at 176.
mRussick v. Hicks, 85 F. Supp. 281 (W.D. Mich. 1949) (loss of mother); Johnson
v. Luhman, 33o Ill. App. 598, 71 N.E.2d 81o (1948) (loss of father); Miller v. Mon-
sen, 288 Minn. 400, 37 N.W.2d 543 (1949) (loss of mother). See also Zepeda v.
Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 19o N.E.2d 849, 856 (1963), in which the court denied
an adulterine bastard a cause of action against his father for subjecting him to an
embarrassing status and, in dictum, reaffirmed the Johnson v. Luhman decision.
"aElder v. MacAlpine-Downie, 180 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (loss of father);
McMillan v. Taylor, 16o F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1946) (loss of mother); Mode v. Bar-
nett, 235 Ark. 641, 361 S.W.2d 525 (1962) (loss of mother); Lucas v. Bishop, 224
Ark. 353, 273 S.W.2d 397 (1954) (loss of mother); Rudley v. Tobias, 84 Cal. App. 2d
454, 190 P.2d 948 (Dist. Ct. App. 1948) (loss of father); Taylor v. Keefe, 134 Conn.
156, 56 A.2d 768 (1947) (loss of mother); Whitcomb v. Huffington, 18o Kan. 340,
304 P.2d 465 (1956) (loss of mother); Nelson v. Richwagen, 326 Mass. 485, 95 N.E.2d
545 (1950) (loss of mother); White v. Thomson, 324 Mass. 140, 85 N.E.2d 246 (1949)
(here the child was denied injunctive relief against the enticer of his parent); Klei-
now v. Ameika, 19 N.J. Super. 165, 88 A.2d 31 (1952) (loss of father); Henson v.
Thomas, 231 N.C. 173, 56 S.E.2d 432 (1949) (loss of mother); Gleitz v. Gleitz, 88
Ohio App. 337, 98 N.E.2d 74 (1951) (loss of father); Garza v. Garza, 209 S.W.2d 1012
(Tex. Civ. App. 1948) (loss of father); Scholberg v. Itnyre, 264 Wis. 211, 58 N.W.2d
698 (1953) (loss of father). For a New York case following the Morrow decision, see
Katz v. Katz, 197 Misc. 412, 95 N.Y.S.2d 863 (Sup. Ct. 195o) (loss of mother).
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earliest reason given by a court for denying the child's right of action
was that such recognition would lead to a flood of litigation.22 This
argument, however, was severely criticized in the Minnesota case of
Miller v. Monsen,23 which recognized the child's right of action. The
Miller case, in refuting this argument, noted that in the jurisdictions
which allowed this action,24 there had not been any flooding of the
courts by this type of litigation.25 The court reasoned "that there
are not enough such enticements to cause even a burdensome increase
of such litigation, much less a flood of it." '26 The court also pointed out
that even it there were an increase of such litigation, this in itself was
not a sufficient ground for denying recovery for the wrongfully in-
flicted injury.27
The major reason given by the courts which have denied the
child's right of action appears to be that since there is no common
law precedent, it is basically a policy matter for the legislature.28
Taylor v. Keefe,29 rejected the contention that the maxim ubi jus ibi
remedium entitled the child to recover. In the Taylor case, the court
reasoned that the Connecticut constitutional provision guaranteeing
redress for an injury only applied to a "legal injury", that is, one vio-
lative of established law of which a court can properly take cognizance.
The lack of a common law precedent, however, was not impressive to
the court in Daily v. Parker.30 There the court said that the mere fact
that rights had not theretofore been recognized was not a conclusive
reason for denying them and the courts could recognize the action
through their judicial lawmaking function. The case of Russick v.
Hicks,31 which also recognized the child's action, reasoned that the
common law recognized this cause of action, since its principles have
2Supra note ii.
F228 Minn. 400, 37 N.W.2d 543 (1949).
"'Daily v. Parker, 152 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945); Johnson v. Luhman, 330 Ill.
App. 598, 1 N.E.2d 8io (1947). Russick v. Hicks, supra note 2o, was decided in the
same year as the Miller case.
-zSupra note 23, at 546.
xlbid.
-Ibid.
2Elder v. MacAlpine-Downie, i8o F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Lucas v. Bishop,
224 Ark. 353, 273 S.W.2d 397 (1954); Rudley v. Tobias, 84 Cal. App. 2d 454, 190
P.2d 984 (Dist. Ct. App. 1948); Whitcomb v. Huffington, i8o Kan. 34 o , 304 P.2d 465
(1956); Henson v. Thomas, 231 N.C. 173, 56 S.E.2d 432 (1949); Gleitz v. Gleitz, 88
Ohio App. 337, 98 N.E.2d 74 (1951); Garza v. Garza, 209 S.W.2d 1012 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1948); Scholberg v. Itnyre, 264 Wis. 211, 58 N.W.2d 698 (1953).
-"34 Conn. 156, 56 A.2d 768 (1947).
'OSupra note 15, at 175.
3185 F. Supp. 281 (W.D. Mich. 1949).
1965]
252 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXII
been determined by the needs of society and are ever susceptible to
changes which the progress of civilization dictates. 32
The North Carolina case of Henson v. Thomas,33 in denying the
child's action, held that the parental immunity from a suit by their
children inures to a third person. The court felt that since the parent
had committed no legal wrong from which redress could be had in a
court of law, one who induced the parent to be remiss did not incur
any greater liability than that of the parent. The court in Miller v.
Monsen,3 4 however, rejected this argument by saying the child's action
was asserted not against the parent, but against the parent's enticer;
and that where the family relationship has been destroyed, the rule
does not apply.35 The court also noted that recovery for loss of ex-
pectancies should be allowed even though the benefits did not result as
a consequence of enforceable legal rights.30
As in the Kane case, at least one other court has refused the child's
action on the ground that the child does not have a contract right that
is similar to that of the husband and wife for loss of consortium,
which is the basis for the spouse's cause of action.37 The Miller case,
however, appears to reject this contention on the basis that although
the child's right to services and affection from the parent is not based
on legal contract rights, such affections and services flow ordinarily as
a matter of course unless interfered with; and that no contract right
is necessary for bringing an action for the intentional interference
with this "natural flow."38
Some courts have also reasoned that in reality it is the parent,
not the child, bringing the action.39 At least one court, however, ap-
pears to have given little weight to this argument. In Russick v.
Hicks,40 two infants were allowed to bring the action through their
father as next friend, notwithstanding the fact that the father was
barred by statute from bringing a similar action in his own behalf.
The court in Scholberg v. Itnyre,41 expressed concern that allowing
the child's action would create a whole new field of litigation, making
1Id. at 286.
'231 N.C. 173, 56 S.E.2d 432, 434 (1949).
3Supra note 23.
'Supra note 23, at 547.
'Supra note 23, at 548.
7Supra note 11.
'Supra note 3, at 548.
nWhitcomb v. Huffington, i8o Kan. 340, 304 P.2d 465 (1956); Katz v. Katz, 197
Misc. 412, 95 N.Y.S.2d 863 (Sup. Ct. 195o).
4085 F. Supp. 2 (W.D. Mich 1949).
'264 Wis. 211, 58 N.W.2d 698, 699 (1953). See Whitcomb v. Huffington, i8o Kan.
340, 304 P.2d 465, 467 (1956).
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grandparents, business companions, and other acquaintances easy prey
to a jealous child. Although there does not appear to be any cases
clearly rejecting this argument, it would seem that it might be used
with equal force against the spouse's right of action.
At least two courts have rejected the child's action on the ground
that it was forbidden by state statute. In Rudley v. Tobias,42 the
California District Court of Appeals concluded that its "Heart Balm"
statute, which prohibited actions for "alienation of affections," pre-
vented a nine-month-old infant from bringing an action for aliena-
tion of his father's affection. In that case, however, the court clearly
based its decision upon its interpretation of the legislative intent and
did not consider the matter of policy. The New York case of Katz v.
Katz,4 3 in denying the child's right of action, clearly relied upon the
state's "Heart Balm" statute, which prohibited the spouse's action. The
court reasoned that the safeguards provided by the "Heart Balm"
statute would be seriously violated by allowing the spouse to sue under
the guise of guardian ad litem. In Russick v. Hicks,44 however, a fed-
eral district court in Michigan recognized the child's right of action
despite a similar statute which barred the spouse's action. The court
in the Russick case reasoned that the spouse's action was the only type
of alienation-of-affections action recognized in Michigan prior to the
enactment of this statute, and therefore, the spouse's action was the
only action which the legislature had intended to abolish.45 When the
Daily v. Parker4N decision was rendered, a similar statute was in effect
in Illinois, but the federal court did not find it controlling since the
state courts had not construed it.
On the other hand, the reasons generally given by the courts which
have recognized the child's right of action are: (i) the doctrine of
"judicial empiricism" allows the court to recognize the child's rights
"84 Cal. App. 2d 454, 190 P.2d 984 (Dist. Ct. App. 1948).
'197 Misc. 412, 95 N.Y.S.2d 863 (Sup. Ct. 1950). The court in Kleinow v. Ameika,
19 N.J. Super. 165, 88 A.2d 31 (1952), also appears to have been influenced by the
New Jersey "Heart Balm" statute which barred the spouse's cause of action. The
court, at 33, said: "No New Jersey case has come to my attention holding that a
child may have such a cause of action where the parent, as here, is barred from
asserting such a claim."
1185 F. Supp. 281 (W.D. Mich. 1949).
'Id. at 286.
10152 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945). It is interesting to note, however, that Heck v.
Schupp, 394 Ill. 296, 68 N.E.2d 464 (1946), later declared the Illinois "Heart Balm
Act" to be in violation of the state constitution. The court, at 466, said: "We are of
the opinion that this act violates section 19 of article H of our state constitution
and is invalid." This section provides in part: "Every person ought to find a certain
remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs which he may receive in his person,
property, or reputation. .. " 11. Const. art. 2 § 19.
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under the modern conception of the family unit;47 (2) the child
should have a right of action based on the maxim ubi jus ibi reme-
dium,48 (3) affording protection to the rights of the child is in the best
interest of both the child and society; 49 (4) the child has a right of ac-
tion by analogy to wrongful interference with expectancies under con-
tract law;50 and (5) the child has a right of action by analogy to the
parents' right of actions for enticement of the child.51
A majority of the courts which have considered this question
have held that a child does not have a cause of action against an in-
tentionally interfering third party for the loss of the affection and so-
ciety of his parent. The reason generally given for denying the ac-
tion is that this is a question for the legislature. It is submitted, how-
ever, that under the well-established doctrine of "judicial empiri-
cism," 52 the courts could and should recognize the child's action against
a third party who has intentionally and maliciously deprived him of
a normal and happy childhood. It is not doubted that recognition
of the child's action would present some difficulties. When weighted
against the injury53 to the child and society, however, these difficulties
should not be so insurmountable as to be prohibitive. Since there
should be no more impediments encountered here than in the well-
established spouse's action, it would seem, at least in jurisdictions
which recognize the spouse's action, that an infant should be entitled
to equal consideration and redress when his injury is equally as great.
EAsirs-r FRANKLIN YEARY
'Daily v. Parker, 152 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945).
"8Cases adopting the reasoning of this judicial principle are: Johnson v. Luhman,
33o Ill. App. 598, 71 N.E.2d 8io (1947), and Miller v. Monsen, supra note 23. In
Russick v. Hicks, 85 Supp. 281 (W.D. Mich. 1949), the court, at 286, stated: "It is
elementary that if a wrong has been committed, there should be a remedy.... The
common law is sufficiently board and comprehensive to afford redress to the plain-
tiffs in the present case." Contra, Heck v. Schupp, 394 Ill. 296, 68 N.E.2d 464 (1946).
4"Miller v. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, 37 N.V.2d 543, 545 (1949).
r'Id., 37 N.W.2d at 549.
6RId. Although there does not appear to be any decision turning on whether
the child is suing for the loss of his mother or for the loss of his father, Miller v.
Monsen, supra note 49, seems to emphasize the mother's importance, for the court
states: "There can be no doubt that benefits of the greatest value flow to the child
from its mother's love, society, care, and service.. .. [and] it is of the highest import-
ance to the child and society that its rights to receive the benefits derived from its
mother be protected." 37 NW.2d at 545. The court also rejected the inability of the
jury to decide the damages, for it states: "Such a right has pecuniary value capable
of measurement." 37 N.W.2d at 545.
5See Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law 181 (1921).
5328 N.C.L. Rev. 397 (195o)-
